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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATEf OF UTAH
GILBERT R. WILBURN,
Applicant/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. d60292-CA

INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
PITTSBURGH, SECOND INJURY FUND
and UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION,

Category No. 6

Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS INTERSTATE ELECTRIC AND
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
—

H

This is an original proceeding seeking review by the Utah
Court of Appeals of an order of the Industrial Commission of
Utah which denied the appellant's application for permanent
total disability benefits under the Utah Worker's Compensation
Act upon the grounds that the appellant had previously compromised and settled his claim for those benefits.
This Court is authorized to conduct a review of the lawfulness of the Commission's order pursuant to the provisions of
§ 35-1-83, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issues for review are:
1.

Whether the appellant's Compensation and Settlement

Agreement is enforceable and thus bars appellant's claim for
permanent total disability benefits.
2.

Whether the findings of the Industrial Commission are

supported by substantial evidence.
3.

Whether the order of the Industrial Commission is

arbitrary and capricious.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Statutory provisions which are determinative in connection
with the Court's review are:
1.

Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-16:

(1) It shall be the duty of the commission, and it
shall have full power, jurisdiction, and authority:
* * *

(e) to promote the voluntary arbitration,
mediation, and conciliation of disputes between
employers and employees; . . .
2.

Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-84:

Upon the filing of the action for review the
court shall direct the commission to furnish and
certify to the Supreme Court, within twenty days, all
proceedings and the transcript of evidence taken in
the case, and the matter shall be determined upon the
record of the commission as certified by it. Upon
such review the court may affirm or set aside such
award, but only upon the following grounds:

(1) That the commission acted without or in
excess of its powers;
(2)
award,
3.

That the findings of fact do not support the

Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-90:

No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to
compensation under this title shall be valid. No
agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the
premium paid by his employer shall be valid. Any
employer who deducts any portion of sucbh premium from
the wages or salary of any employee entitled to the
benefits of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor, and
shall be fined not more than $100 for each such
offense.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of facts contained in the Brief of Appellant
Gilbert R. Wilburn is incomplete and thus misleading.

It cites

as "fact" much of Mr. Wilburn's own self-serving testimony which
was contradicted by other evidence and by cross-examination and
thus not a proper basis for the findings of the Industrial
Commission.

Thus, defendants submit the following statement of

facts to supplement and clarify the record:
1.

Mr. Wilburn claims that on April ]J4, 1980, while work-

ing for Interstate Electric, he had occasion to lift a portable
generator from the floor to his workbench.

It was a small

portable model intended to be moved about manually.
activity was not unusual nor unexpected.
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This

It was a normal,

routine and common function which he did on a regular basis
while at work.
2.

(R. 84-85.)

In a recorded statement which Mr. Wilburn gave on

May 22, 1980, he indicated that he did not feel pain in his
back until five to ten minutes after the described lifting.
His representations were as follows:
Q.

Can you describe what you felt as you, you know
when you picked this up?

A.

Well after I did it I felt pain in my back.

Q.

How soon after you did it?

A.

Almost right away, fairly soon anyway.

Q.

Okay, so it wasn't while you were actually
lifting?

A.

Within oh (inaudible).

Q.

Okay, within what?

A.

5-10 minutes, I don't know. in fact I didn't
even think anything of it (inaudible).

(R, 350-351.;
3.

Mr. Wilburn continued working but consulted Dr. Gene

Smith the following day concerning his low back pains.
Dr. Smith

examined

him and then

work within a few days.

released

him to his

regular

He took three days off work and

underwent some physical therapy for two to three weeks.

He

continued to work thereafter for over a year without additional
medical treatment.

(R. 1, 59-60, 65, 297.)

4.

On February 2, 1981, Mr. Wilburn Was examined by

Dr. Wallace Hess for the purpose of obtaining a disability
rating which was then determined to be a 5^ permanent partial
disability from the claimed work injury plus a 15% permanent
partial disability due to a preexisting loW back condition.
(R. 177-180.)

Based upon said rating, Wiltjurn was paid for a

permanent partial disability of 20%, with t!he employer and the
Second Injury Fund paying their pro rata shares.
5.

(R. 102.)

Mr. Wilburn's first medical treatment for his low back

after April 1980 was on August 18, 1981, when he went to see
Dr. Gordon Affleck after he had been laid o|ff work on July 31,
1981.

(R. 11, 65-66, 297.)

Dr. Affleck pliaced him on tempo-

rary total disability which was paid by the employer from then
until September 30, 1983.
6.

(R. 298-300.)

On June 20, 1983, Mr. Wilburn was reexamined by

Dr. Hess who noted a degeneration of Wilburh's arthritic
condition, especially as it affected his ne<:k and ankles, a
condition unrelated to the industrial injury.

Dr. Hess then

determined that the permanent partial disability was a combined
total of 36% with 10% assigned to the claimed industrial injury,
15% assigned to preexisting arthritis in th^ low back, and 15%
assigned to a non-industrial cervical spine condition.
(R. 181-189.)

7.

Sometime in late 1983, Mr. Wilburn consulted with

Administrative Law Judge Jan Moffitt at the Industrial Commission, who advised him to make a claim for permanent total
disability.

She referred Mr. Wilburn to Attorney Robert

Shaughnessy, with whom he then consulted.
8.

(R. 122-123, 322.)

By his report dated February 1, 1984, Dr. Affleck

rendered the opinion: "Mr. Wilburn is not capable of any
significant employment, especially in the area that he has any
training or capability in."

(R. 248.)

Thereafter, the appli-

cant contacted National Union, the worker's compensation
insurance carrier, claimed additional continuing disability
compensation, and was then referred by the carrier to its
attorney, Stuart L. Poelman, who met with Wilburn on
February 24, 1984.
9.

(R. 31.)

While meeting with Mr. Wilburn, Mr. Poelman noted that

the employer and its carrier could raise several defenses to
Mr. Wilburn's claim for permanent disability, including the
defense that the events of April 14, 1980, as described by
Mr. Wilburn in his statement, did not constitute an industrial
"accident" under the then-existing legal interpretation of that
concept.

It was explained to Mr. Wilburn that if the employer

and its carrier were successful in asserting that defense, he
would lose his claim for all additional compensation, including
future medical expenses.

On April 26, 1984, Mr. Wilburn talked

again with Mr. Poelman, at which time Mr. Wilburn noted his
assertion of a claim for permanent total disability and a
discussion was had concerning the effect off the "no accident"
defense of the defendants.
advice of other counsel.

Mr. Wilburn was told to seek the
He suggested, and Mr. Poelman

concurred, that he confer with Judge Jan Mqffitt or Judge Tim
Allen at the Industrial Commission.

The trade offs of a

settlement were discussed, and Mr. Wilburn then offered to
settle for an additional 10% permanent partial disability.
(R. 129-130, 322-323.) Thereafter a verbal agreement was
reached and a written Compromise and Settlement Agreement was
prepared by Mr. Poelman and sent to Mr. Wilburn on May 31,
1984.

(R. 35, 115.)

10.

In June 1984 Mr. Wilburn consulted with Attorney Shaun

Howell, legal counsel for the Industrial Commission, and asked
her for her advice concerning the settlement.
117-119.)

(R. 112,

During that consultation, Mr. Wilburn knew of the

risk he might take by pursuing his claim to a hearing.
(R. 117.)

Attorney Howell had met with Mr. Wilburn on various

occasions:

first when he brought in an application seeking a

continuation of total disability benefits ahd indicated that he
-was going to make a claim for permanent total disability; again
when he delivered some medical records to Ms. Howell for her
review; and then again when he brought in a copy of the written
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Compromise and Settlement Agreement for review.

(R. 134-138.)

Attorney Howell testified at the hearing before the Industrial
Commission that during those discussions it was clear that
Mr. Wilburn was asserting a claim for permanent total disability, that he knew of the defenses which had been explained
to him by Mr. Poelman, and that she discussed those defenses
with Mr, Wilburn, including the "no accident" defense which, if
successful, would bar him from entitlement to future medical
expenses.
11.

(R. 113-114, 141, 145.)
After considering the initial written Compromise and

Settlement Agreement, Mr. Wilburn returned and asked that the
agreement add payment to him of an additional $1,590.00 for
temporary total disability for the period of September 30, 1983
to November 22, 1983.

The defendants agreed and the written

agreement was then revised and sent to Mr. Wilburn for his
signature.

He then read it, asked Judge Moffitt about it, and

signed it.

(R. 115, 144.) It was then sent to the Industrial

Commission on November 1, 1984, and was approved by the Commission through its legal counsel, Shaun Howell, on November 28,
1984.

(R. 36, 40.)

Defendants then made payment to Mr. Wilburn

as specified by the agreement.
12.

(R. 115-116.)

When Mr. Wilburn entered into the written Compromise

and Settlement Agreement he was age 63 and had not worked for
over three years.

(R. 119.)

He was then on total disability
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under Social Security and was claiming that he could not work.
(R. 93, 119.)

At the time the settlement agreement was entered

into, it was the understanding of the defendants that the agreement compromised and settled Mr. Wilburn's claim for permanent
total disability.
13.

(R. 151.)

On February 13, 1986, Mr. Wilburn, through his attorney

Michael Dyer, filed an application with th^ Industrial Commission seeking permanent total disability benefits from the
defendants.

(R. 43.)

The defendants answered the application

asserting various defenses, including the fact that the claim
is barred by the Compromise and Settlement Agreement theretofore entered into with Mr. Wilburn.

(R. 44-45.)

Hearing on

the application was held on May 14, 1986, before Administrative
Law Judge Richard Sumsion.

(R. 49.)

Judge Sumsion issued his

Tentative Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on
May 28, 1986, whereby he found Mr. Wilburn to be permanently
and totally disabled, referred him to rehabilitation services
as required by statute and imposed liability for permanent
total disability upon the defendants.

(R. 338-345.)

However,

pursuant to a Motion for Review and Clarification filed by the
defendants and responded to by counsel for Iplr. Wilburn
(R. 357-371), Judge Sumsion issued his Supplemental Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, whereby he vacated his
prior interim order of May 28, 1986, and ru^ed that the

Compromise and Settlement Agreement entered into between the
parties and approved by the Commission on November 28, 1984, is
binding and precludes the applicant from asserting his claim
for permanent total disability.

(R. 372-376.)

Counsel for

Mr. Wilburn then obtained review of the Supplemental Order by
the full Commission.

(R. 377.)

Memoranda covering all of the

issues raised in this appeal were then submitted to the
Commission.

(R. 380-406.)

Upon review, the Commission denied

appellant's Motion for Review, with all three commissioners
concurring.
14.

(R. 407.)

Included in the findings of The Industrial Commission

are the following:
(a) The defendants were in good faith in asserting
the defense that the alleged event did not constitute a
compensable accident.

(R. 339.)

(b) Mr. Wilburn clearly contemplated asserting a
claim for permanent total disability several months before
he executed the Compromise and Settlement Agreement.
(R. 341.)
(c)

It was the clear understanding of the parties

that the trade off contemplated by the agreement included a
relinquishing of Mr. Wilburn's claim for permanent total
disability.

(R. 341.)

(d) The parties stipulated in th£ written agreement
itself that there was a bona fide issue as to the compensability of the applicant's claim at th£ time of the
agreement.

(R. 38.)

(e) The agreement had been approved by the Industrial
Commission's legal counsel.
(f)

(R. 40.)

Settlement of industrial claims is usually a

desireable objective from a policy standpoint.

(R. 373.)

(g) Mr. Wilburn had been advised to and did discuss
his claim with an attorney prior to signing the Compromise
and Settlement Agreement.

(R. 373.)

(h) Mr. Wilburn discussed the Compromise and
Settlement Agreement with the Commissio|n • s legal counsel
who approved the settlement after discussing with
Mr. Wilburn all of its ramifications.

(R. 373.)

(i) Mr. Wilburn gave long and serious consideration
to the execution of the agreement and the agreement was not
prepared on the spur of the moment and |signed hastily.
(R. 373.)
(j) The applicant understood the possibility of
losing medical benefits if he were to Ipse his claim on the
issue of "no accident."

(R. 373.)

(k) A settlement agreement such a£ that of
Mr. Wilburn's is valid under Utah law when an issue
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concerning the compensability of the claim is at issue.
(R. 372.)
(1) To invalidate Mr. Wilburn's agreement would
seriously undermine the entire settlement process, rendering such so uncertain and unpredictable as to seldom be
worthy of serious consideration.

(R. 374.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:
1.

The Supreme Court has validated agreements between

employers and employees to settle worker's compensation claims.
2.

Legislative and public policy favor such agreements as

approved by the Industrial Commission.
POINT II:
1.

The evidence of record, reviewed in light of Utah law

as it existed when the Compromise and Settlement Agreement was
negotiated, demonstrates that the defense of "no accident" was
asserted in good faith and was a bona fide issue to be negotiated.
2.

The Industrial Commission's findings of defendants'

good faith is supported by substantial evidence.
3.

The closeness of an issue, if it is bona fide, cannot

be raised in later proceedings as a factor to invalidate the
settlement agreement.
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4.

The issues settled by an agreement^ cannot be later

litigated and the results of such litigation then used to argue
whether the issue was a bona fide issue at the time of the
settlement.
POINT III;
1.

The Industrial Commission's finding that the Compromise

and Settlement Agreement contemplated the Settlement of the
appellant's claim for permanent total disability is supported
by abundant evidence.
2.

The Industrial Commission's findirlgs in this case

cannot be changed by the Court of Appeals ijnder the statutory
and common law standards of review imposed upon the court.

-13-

ARGUMEKT
POINT I.
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN AN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE
COMPROMISING AND SETTLING A DISPUTED CLAIM
OF LIABILITY UNDER THE UTAH WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT ARE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE,
In the case of Brigham Young University v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 279 P. 889 (Utah 1929), the Utah Supreme Court
long ago established that an employer and employee may enter
into a binding settlement agreement which compromises and
settles an employee's claim for Worker's Compensation benefits.
In the BYU case, the claim in question included, among other
things, a dispute concerning whether the employee was injured
by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment
and also whether or not the alleged accident was the cause of
the employee's subsequent death.
compensability of the claim.

Thus, at issue was the very

The Court specifically addressed

the affect of what is now designated as § 35-1-90, Utah Code
Ann., which reads:
No agreement by an employee to waive his rights
to compensation under this title shall be valid. No
agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the
premium paid by his employer shall be valid. Any
employer who deducts any portion of such premium from
the wages or salary of any employee entitled to the
benefits of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor, and
shall be fined not more than $100 for each such
offense.

-14-

Contrary to the assertions contained in Appellant's Brief
herein, the Court ruled that said statutory provision does not
preclude a valid and enforceable compromise and settlement
agreement as between the employer and the employee.

In so

doing, the Court stated:
Let it be assumed that it is competent for the Legislature to restrict the right of the employer and
employe to make settlements or impose Conditions upon
which they may be made, yet in our opinion the
Legislature has not, either by express language or by
necessary implication, done so.

The section of this Act referred to do^s not, in our
judgment, support the view that the ridht of the
employer and employe to settle a clainvarising under
the Act after it has arisen is circumscribed or
prohibited.

The right of parties sui juris to settle their own
controversy and avoid litigation is a valuable and
absolute right, and may be exercised by them under all
circumstances, unless the state, under proper exercise
of police power, has circumscribed, res tricted or
prohibited it. Holding as we do that such inhibition
or restriction neither expressly or by Necessary
implication is manifest by the Act, we think the
parties had the undoubted right to make the settlement
which was made by them.
Id. at 892-893.
In the instant case the Industrial Commission has upheld
the validity of Mr. Wilburn's Compromise anfl Settlement
Agreement and specifically noted the Commission's policy with
respect to such agreements.

The settlement of any claim is usually a desireable
objective. The settlement of a disputed claim is
particularly desireable because an adjudication of the
claim seldom satisfies both parties and frequently
leads to appeals and delays that thwart the beneficient purposes of workmen's compensation legislation.
The policy of the Commission has been, and should
continue to be, one that encourages the settlement of
claims. It has been the long-standing practice of the
Industrial Commission to approve settlements. This
practice has operated as a safeguard against abuses
that might otherwise occur, if an unscrupulous
employer or insurance carrier attempted to take
advantage of an unsophisticated worker seeking to
settle a claim without the advice of counsel. The
practice also affords some protection against clerical
errors in the calculation of benefits payable to an
Applicant.
(R. 373.)
Appellant further attempts to rely upon the case of Barber
Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 135 P.2d 266 (Utah
1943) to support his attempt to invalidate his own settlement
agreement.

The Industrial Commission specifically addressed

the Barber Asphalt case in its findings and noted that it is
distinguishable from the BYU case as well as Mr. Wilburn's
case, since in both the BYU case and Mr. Wilburn's case the
settlement involved a disputed claim of compensability.

The

Commission noted:
In the Barber Asphalt case there was no issue as to
the fact that the applicant's injury arose out of or
in the course of employment as a result of a compensable industrial accident. This was in sharp contrast
to the BYU case in which the Court specifically stated
that the compensability of the claim was a close issue
"concerning which reasonable minds might well differ
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and the right of the applicant to recover was doubtful."
(R. 372.)
The Barber Asphalt case did not invalidate all settlements
of Worker's Compensation claims nor did it overrule the BYU
case.

It simply held that where the compensability of a

worker's compensation claim is not disputed, an employee
cannot, by agreement, waive his claim to future compensation
since the Worker's Compensation Act vests the Commission with
continuing jurisdiction to increase an awa^d upon a showing of
a change in the employee's condition which was not known at the
time of the original award.

Nothing in tha Barber Asphalt case

prohibits an employer and employee from settling claims which
have already accrued, nor does it prevent tihe final settlement
of a claim when the compensability of that si aim is at issue.
In considering Mr. Wilburn's claim, th^ Industrial
Commission specifically found that his Compromise and Settlement Agreement was entered into for the purpose of resolving an
issue concerning the compensability of his claim.

At issue was

whether or not "Ir. Wilburn's lifting of th^ portable generator
during the course of his work constituted an "accident" within
the meaning of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act.

The

Commission correctly applied the holding of the BYU case and
found that the Barber Asphalt case was not applicable.
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The

Commission thus held that Mr. Wilburn's agreement was enforceable, that it was the intent of the parties under such agreement to settle the claim for permanent total disability and it
therefore barred Mr. Wilburn's claim for permanent total
disability as filed thereafter.
The Appellant cites certain cases from other jurisdictions
in an attempt to support his claim that his settlement agreement should be invalidated; i.e., Walcome v. Paul Mushero
Construction Co., 498 A.2d 593 (Me. 1985); Hansen v. Jer Her
Builders, 366 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 1985), and Ruiz v. City of
Albuquerque, 577 P.2d 424 (N.M. 1978).

A critical review of

these cases reveals that they do not support the Appellant's
position with respect to the validity of settlement agreements
between the employer and the employee.

On the contrary, each

of those cases upholds the validity of such agreements.

In all

three cases the compensability of the claim was not even at
issue, and, even so, the court upheld the agreement insofar as
it settled the particular accrued claims covered by the agreement.

The issues addressed in those cases merely involved a

determination of what claims were covered by the agreements.
In the Walcome case, the court found that the settlement agreement only covered the claimed foot injuries and that a claim
for back injuries, arising out of the same accident, was not
covered by the agreement.

The court did not refuse to enforce

-13-

the agreement as to the foot injuries.
scope of the agreement.

It simply defined the

In the Hansen case, the settlement

agreement was held to be valid and enforceable with respect to
the vision impairment which it expressly covered.

The written

agreement expressly provided that "all oth^r claims are left
open."

Thus the court remanded the cases ^or a factual

determination concerning what other injuries to the head, other
than vision impairment, had been sustained as a result of the
industrial accident.

In essence, the court was simply enforc-

ing the settlement agreement in conformity ^/ith its express
provisions and the intent of the parties,

^nd again, in the

Ruiz case, the court upheld the settlement Agreement as valid
and enforceable but determined that its scojoe was limited to a
settlement of claims "described in the complaint."

It was

determined that the agreement did not cover a claim for
rehabilitation benefits since such had not been included in the
complaint referred to.
Appellant also cites the case of Cretelja v. New York Dock
Co., 45 N.E.2d 429 (N.Y. 1942), as supporting his position.
However, a review of the Cretelia case reveals that it deals
only with the issue which was addressed by t[he Utah Court in
the Barber Asphalt case.

In Cretelia, the Compensability of

the claim was not at issue.

The court simply held, as the Utah

court held in Barber Asphalt, that because c^f the Commission
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continuing jurisdiction, employers and employees had, under New
York law, limited powers of settlement.

The court determined

that the agreement under review had failed to comply with the
New York law.

The court did not, by its ruling in Cretella,

invalidate the compromise of a worker's compensation claim
where the compensability of the claim was at issue.
Thus, appellant has failed to cite a single case, either in
Utah or in any other jurisdiction, which supports the invalidation of Mr. Wilburn's Compromise and Settlement Agreement with
the defendants.

The BYU case is the law in Utah and should be

followed.
As noted by the Industrial Commission, there are good
public policy reasons for allowing an employer and employee to
settle claims to the extent that they have already accrued or
where the compensability of the entire claim is at issue.

The

Worker's Compensation Act favors an expedited resolution of
claims.

For this Court to invalidate the resolution of accrued

claims by means of settlement would be counterproductive to the
intent of the Act.

Without the power to settle, employers and

employees would be forced into endless and unnecessary litigation.

The order of the Commission in this case should be

affirmed.

As the Commission noted:

To invalidate the agreement at this time would
seriously undermine the entire settlement process,
render such so uncertain and unpredictable as to
seldom be worthy of serious consideration.
(R. 374.)
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The Legislature specifically gave the Industrial Commission
the power and duty to foster the expedited resolution of claims
under the Workman's Compensation Act,

Section 35-1-16(1) of

the Act provides:
(1) It shall be the duty of the commission, and
it shall have full power, jurisdiction, and authority:
* * *

(e) to promote the voluntary arbitration,
mediation, and conciliation of disputes between
employers and employees. (Emphasis added.)
Certainly it was the intent of the Utah Legislature that
the Commission should have the authority to resolve such
disputes by means of a settlement which it scrutinizes and
approves.

Such was the action by the Commission in regard to

Mr. Wilburn's claim.
POINT II.
THE COMPENSABILITY OF WILBURN'S CLAIM WAS A BONA
FIDE ISSUE WHEN THE COMPENSATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED AND APPROVED.
Appellant urges that the Mno accident" defense asserted by
the defendants, was not sufficiently significant to establish a
bona fide issue of compensability.

The Industrial Commission

found otherwise . . . and for good reason.

The significance of

the no accident defense must be assessed by understanding the
status of the law on that issue as it existed at the time of
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the agreement, not as it is now subsequently changed.

At the

time of the agreement, the issue of what constituted an
industrial "accident" so as to support a claim for worker's
compensation benefits had been the subject of substantial
litigation resulting in Supreme Court decisions which had
generated inconsistent results.

Consequently, various

administrative law judges at the Industrial Commission were
deciding the issue based upon differing factors and differing
emphases.

This inconsistency created an uncertainty which

caused an increasing number of claims filed with the Industrial
Commission to be litigated.

The inconsistency in court deci-

sions has now just recently been acknowledged and a solution
has been addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986),
wherein the Court stated:
Prior decisions by this Court have often failed
to distinguish the analysis of the acts in question
and the discussion of causation elements. As a result,
this Court and the Commission are faced with confusing
and often inconsistent precedent. For this reason, we
now undertake a fresh look at the policy and historical background of the worker's compensation statute in
an attempt to provide a clear and workable rule for
future application by the Commission.
Id. at 18.
At the time Mr. Wilburn and the defendants entered into
their Compromise and Settlement Agreement, the defendants were
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justified in believing that there was a good chance of prevailing on the "no accident" issue should the matter be litigated.
Court decisions upon which they could rely placed emphasis on
the accidental and unintentional nature of the activity or
event which caused the injury, not upon the accidental and
unintentional nature of the injury itself.

In 1969, the Court

had decided Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission,
454 P.2d 283 (Utah 1969), wherein the Court denied compensation
in a case where the employee herniated a disc in his back while
riding in and driving a long-haul truck,

there the Supreme

Court stated:
There is nothing in this record that shows any
unusual event, or "accident," if you pljease, justifying compensability within the nature, intent or spirit
of the workmen's compensation act. To conclude otherwise would ensure every truck driver, every railroad
engineer, every airplane pilot, and a lot of others,
against a physiological malfunction or physical
collapse of any of hundreds of human organs completely
unproven as to cause, but compensable only by virtue
of the happenstance that the malfunction, collapse or
injury occurred while the employee was on the job, and
not home or elsewhere.
Id. at 285.
In 1979, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Industrial
Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979), in which it denied
compensation under the Worker's Compensation Act for a herniated disc which occurred when the employee, after having set up
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a series of chairs, sat down to rest and then stood up suddenly
to answer the telephone.

There was.no dispute as to the causal

relationship between the herniated disc and the work activity,
but the Court denied compensation on the grounds that no
accident had occurred.

In so doing, the Court stated:

The only facts relating to the claimed accident
were presented by the testimony of Thurman, and there
is nothing contained therein that warrants a conclusion
that an accident occurred. There is nothing in his
testimony that shows anything unusual about his activities, that shows any unusual exertion or strain, or
that shows any contact with objects or a fall. There
is simply nothing different about his activities on
the day in question than on any other such working day.
Id. at 329.
Thereafter, the Court decided the case of Farmers Grain
Co-op v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980), and denied compensation to Mr. Mason who, it was found, sustained injury to his
back as a result of unloading 100 pound bags of whey from a
delivery truck.

The court noted that Mr. Mason had suffered

from back ailments prior to his alleged accident and the Court
stated:
The evidence further reveals that the type of
work activity engaged in by defendant (that of unloading heavy cargo) was not unusual or unexpected. The
work was typical of that of a truck driver and comparable to the work he had followed for a number of
years. Further, the aggravation of his physical
condition gradually developed without the intervention
of any "external occurrence" or trauma.
Id. at 239-240.

Then again in 1982, the Court determined, by its opinion in
Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P. 2^3 722 (Utah 1982),
that an employee who injured his back whilfe unloading boxes in
the course of his employment was not entitled to worker's
compensation benefits since no "accident" had occurred.

Citing

numerous prior decisions, the Court applied its strict interpretation of "accident" in upholding the determination of the
administrative law judge that:
The activities of this morning wei*e not unusual
and were not strenuous in any way. He had only loaded
a couple of boxes and was doing the same thing that he
frequently did in connection with his employment in
unloading boxes which usually required bending over
and picking them up. He has done the ^ame thing many
times in the past.
Id.

at 723-724.
* * *

In order to recover worker's compensation benefits, the applicant must have incurred an injury as
the result of an accident during the course of his
employment. Though it is clear that the applicant was
engaged in his regular employment and t|hat there was
an injury, we cannot find that there wals an accident
in the sense contemplated by the worker's compensation
statutes . . .
Id. at 724.

The mere fact that defendant's impairment
resulted (in the words of Dr. Maumberger) "entirely
from the incident which he alleges to" $hould not
imply that a compensable accident has occurred, as
defined in this opinion.
Id. at 726
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With this background of judicial decision, and faced with
the facts of the Wilburn claim as then analyzed by counsel for
the defendants, there can be no question that the defendants
asserted the "no accident" defense to Mr. Wilburn's claims in
good faith, as found by the Industrial Commission,

At that

time, defendants had then determined that Mr. Wilburn1s lifting
of the portable generator did not involve any external trauma,
nor did it involve any unusual event.

It was one of

Mr. Wilburn's common, usual and intended activities at work.
Moreover, he had indicated in his statement that his back pain
did not occur until five to ten minutes after that lifting
episode.

It had further been determined that Mr. Wilburn

suffered from a preexisting back condition and that the onset
of back pain as a result of lifting activities could likely be
expected.

It was further determined that following the lifting

episode, Mr. Wilburn had only once been examined by Dr. Smith
and had not thereafter sought any medical treatment for his
back, following a short period of therapy, until after he had
lost his job over a year later.
The "no accident" defense asserted by defendants was real
and viable.

The parties stipulated in the written agreement

itself that "there exists a serious and disputed question as to
whether or not the employer is liable to the applicant for any
benefits under the Worker's Compensation Act." (R. 38.)
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There

is no evidence in the record that the defendants acted in bad
faith or that Mr. Wilburn was subjected to any kind of fraud or
misrepresentation.

When a settlement agreement is negotiated

based upon a bona fide issue of compensability, it should be
upheld.
In order to make such an agreement possible, its validity
cannot later be scrutinized based upon an ifter-the-fact debate
as to how close the disputed issue was.

The closeness of the

issue is always one of the factors considered by the parties in
connection with their negotiation of the t^rms of the agreement.

That factor is weighed in determining what consideration

should be paid for the agreement.

If the tissue is a bona fide

one and is asserted in good faith, then it should be sufficient
to support the validity of the Settlement Agreement enteredinto.

To allow the closeness of the issue, if otherwise bona

fide, to be later litigated and used as a mfeans of invalidating
the agreement would render impotent any attempt to negotiate an
agreement in the first place.
Judge Sumsion properly acknowledged that his own determination that there was an industrial accident, made in retrospect,
is not relevant as to whether or not the Compromise and
Settlement Agreement "constituted a compromise and settlement
of a disputed claim."

He correctly found that the compen-

sability of Mr. Wilburn's claim was disputed in good faith,
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that the "no accident" issue was a bona fide issue at the time
the agreement was entered into and that it was an issue upon
which reasonable minds could well differ.

(R. 374.) It is

clear that the defendants and Mr. Wilburn entered into their
settlement agreement in order to avoid litigation, as well as
to avoid the risk of the "no accident" issue being determined
in favor of the opposing party.

It would be senseless to now

hold that the agreement could later be held invalid by reason
of the actual later litigation of that issue when the whole
purpose of the Agreement was to settle and thus avoid that
issue and the litigation thereof.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE AMPLY SUPPORTS THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT MR. WILBURN HAD SETTLED
HIS CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY.
Mr. Wilburn attempted to persuade the Industrial Commission
that, when he entered into the Compromise and Settlement
Agreement with the defendants, he did not understand that he
was settling his claim for permanent total disability.

The

evidence is overwhelmingly to the contrary, and the Industrial
Commission found against him on that issue:
The applicant clearly contemplated asserting a
claim for permanent total disability several months
before he executed the Compromise and Settlement
Agreement. There is no evidence of a "subsequent
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change of condition or a new development not contemplated at the time of the release or settlement
agreement." On the other hand, at the time the
applicant executed the Compromise and settlement
Agreement, he was not represented by counsel even
though he had sought the advice of counsel early on in
the negotiations. The stated basis for executing the
agreement was to avoid the necessity o£ further litigating the "no accident" issue and, in doing so,
assuring the applicant of a continuation of his medical
benefits and some additional compensation
There is
no express provision that the agreemen was a tradeoff
with respect to the applicant's potential claim for
permanent total disability, even though this clearly
was the understanding of the parties.
(R. 341.)

(Emphasis added.)

In Wilburn's case, he was advised to and did
discuss his claim with an attorney, butl at the time he
signed the Compromise and Settlement Agreement, he was
not represented by counsel. He did, however, discuss
the Compromise and Settlement Agreement with the
Commission's Legal Counsel, who approve the Settlement after discussing all of its ramifi ations with
the Applicant. Based upon the testimon of the
Commission's former legal counsel who a proved this
particular Agreement, and based upon th Applicant•s
own testimony, there can be little doub that the
Applicant gave long and serious conside ation to the
execution of the Agreement. This was n t an Agreement
that was prepared on the spur of the mo ient and signed
hastily. It was, in fact, prepared weelks, if not
months, before it was actually executed] By his own
admission, the Applicant, at the time the Agreement
was signed, was extremely concerned about ensuring a
continuation of his medical benefits which were
assured if he agreed to the terms of the Compromise
and Settlement Agreement. If not, there is no doubt
that the Applicant understood the possibility of
losing that benefit if he were to lose his claim on
the issue of "no accident."
(R. 373.)
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The Utah Court of Appeals is bound by law to affirm these
findings as made by the Industrial Commission, since the court
is governed by special standards of review imposed by both
statute and case law.

Section 35-1-84, Utah Code Ann. (1953)

provides, in part:
Upon such review the court may affirm or set
aside such award, but only upon the following grounds:
(1) That the Commission acted without or in
excess of its powers;
(2)
award.

That the findings of fact do not support the

The Utah Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its interpretation of this standard of review in the case of Blaine v.
Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1985).

After

quoting the above statute, the Supreme Court stated:
This Court has interpreted the foregoing statutory standard on numerous occasions and has concluded
that the Commission's findings are not to be displaced
in the absence of a showing that they are arbitrary
and capricious.
Id. at 1086.
In the Blaine case, the Supreme Court cited the prior case
of Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981),
wherein the standards of review were discussed:
Under any of these standards--Kavalinakis, Kent
and Norris—it is apparent that this Court's function
in reviewing Commission findings of fact is a strictly
limited one in which the question is not whether the
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Court agrees with the Commission's findings or whether
they are supported by a preponderance of evidence.
Instead, the reviewing Court's inquiry is whether the
Commission's findings are "arbitrary or capricious,"
or "wholly without cause," or contrary to the "one
[inevitable] conclusion from the evidence," or without
"any substantial evidence" to support them. Only then
should the Commission's findings be displaced.
Id. at 890.
These standards have been longstanding\

In the early case

of Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. Industrial Commission, 196 P. 853
(Utah 1921), the Utah Supreme Court established the standard
for review of the evidence with respect to Industrial
Commission cases:
This Court is now firmly committed to the doctrine
that it will examine the evidence only to ascertain
whether there is any substantial evidence in support
of the findings of the Commission, and whether it has
acted without or in excess of its juris]diction.
Id. at 877.
In the instant case, the evidence supporting the
Commission's finding that Mr. Wilburn understood and intended
to relinquish his claim for permanent total disability is not
only substantial, it is abundant.

In fact, with the exception

of Mr. Wilburn's own self-serving testimonyj, it is nearly
conclusive.

That evidence includes the fact that Mr. Wilburn

was totally disabled before he ever presented his claim to the
defendants for additional benefits in February 1984. At that

time he was 63 years of age, he hadn't worked since July 1981
(R. 119/ 331); he had already applied for and was receiving
total disability benefits from Social Security (R. 119); he was
then representing that he could no longer work (R. 119);
Dr. Affleck had certified that he was no longer employable
(R. 248); and both Dr. Hess and Richard Olson from the State
Division of Rehabilitation had informed him that he was not a
good candidate for rehabilitation (R. 121, 189). It was
further noted that when he did claim additional benefits, he
was asserting a claim for ongoing total disability.

Further-

more, Mr. Wilburn admitted talking to Mr. Poelman about his
claim for permanent total disability (R. 111). He testified
that he did not disagree with the content of Mr. Poelman1s
memorandum which outlined some of the factors discussed in
connection with their negotiation of the settlement agreement,
including Mr. Wilburn's claim of permanent total disability.
(R. 129-130.)
It is also clear that before Mr. Wilburn signed his
Compromise and Settlement Agreement, he had been thoroughly
advised concerning its ramifications by both Mr. Poelman and
the commission's legal counsel, Shaun Howell.

He even admitted

that he had previously discussed asserting his claim with Judge
Moffitt of the Commission and with attorney Robert Shaughnessy,
On the other hand, there is no evidence of record that
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Mr* Wilburn was not claiming permanent totial disability in
connection with the negotiation of his Compromise and
Settlement Agreement.
hearing was:

His testimony concerning that matter at

"I don't remember, but I cou|ld have."

(R. 110.)

It is further clear from the record th£t in order to secure
the settlement agreement, the defendants w^re required to pay
all, if not more, in benefits under the settlement agreement
than they would have had to pay if the claim had gone to hearing and defendants could have asserted their various other
defenses.

The only thing which Mr. Wilburiji had left to give up

in exchange for the defendants' waiver of its "no accident"
defense was his claim for permanent total disability.
It should be noted that the accuracy o^ Mr. Wilburn's own
testimony is suspect and that the Industrial Commission is not
bound to accept such testimony without qua]jification.

In the

case of Bain v. Industrial Commission, 199 P. 666 (Utah 1921),
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
. . . it must be remembered that the filndings and
conclusions of the Commission on questiIons of fact are
conclusive and final, and not subject t|o review,
Before this Court can disturb such find!ings and
conclusions, it must appear as a matter of law that
they are contrary to the law and contra ry to the
evidence. The Commission are the judge|s of the
credibility of the witnesses, and in de termining the
facts, if there is any substantial reas on why they
should not believe the testimony of any particular
witness, they have the undoubted right fo disregard it
and eliminate it from consideration.
Id. at 666-667,
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It was obvious that Mr. Wilburn's testimony was, in some
respects, contradictory or contradicted.
respects, exaggerated.

It was, in other

For example, Mr. Wilburn

initially

testified that prior to April 14, 1980, he had no back
problem.

(R. 53.)

Upon cross-examination, however, he

admitted to having some back problems.

(R. 82.)

The medical

records in evidence amply demonstrate that he had significant
preexisting back problems.
the hearing

Mr. Wilburn also testified both at

(R. 127) and by sworn affidavit (R. 328) that he

had never been advised to seek the assistance of counsel in
connection with the negotiation and execution of his Compromise
and Settlement Agreement.

This testimony was squarely contra-

dicted by the applicant's own testimony to the effect that when
he met with Judge Moffitt in 1983, she provided him with a list
of attorneys, and he then conferred with Attorney Robert
Shaughnessy.

(R. 122-123.)

It is further contradicted by the

testimony at hearing of Attorney Shaun Howell (R. 145) and the
memorandum of Stuart Poelman (R. 3 2 2 ) .

Mr. Wilburn also testi-

fied at the hearing concerning the details of his claimed
accident and it became apparent that he was embellishing

the

facts beyond and in contradiction to the same description of
facts which he had given in his statement dated May 22, 1980.
(R. 347.)

Certainly the Industrial Commission was justified in

discounting the credibility of Mr. Wilburn's own self-serving
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testimony.

Mr. Wilburn claimed that he wai confused by the

language in the Compromise and Settlement Agreement dealing
with reimbursements between the employer ar(id its carrier and
the Second Injury Fund.

The Industrial Cortimission was fully

justified in disbelieving Mr. Wilburn concerning such alleged
confusion.

It is apparent that the confusijon in such language

was more a ploy by counsel to generate an issue than a true
source of confusion to Mr. Wilburn.
Appellant notes that the Compromise and] Settlement Agreement does not contain explicit language deflining the claims
which were settled thereby.

However, it should also be noted

that the written agreement does not specify what defenses were
being relinquished by the defendants.

Mr. ^ilburn certainly

does not dispute that the Agreement contemplated that he should
retain his right to future medical expenses
set forth in the Agreement.

That, too, is not

Obviously the Written Compromise

and Settlement Agreement was not designed t0 specify all of
those items.

Thus, it was incumbent upon tljie Industrial

Commission to determine those matters from ill of the evidence.
It was clearly understood and readily ascertained by Mr. Wilburn
that the intent of the agreement was to ensure him of continuing medical benefits.

By the same token, it} is clear by the

evidence that Mr. Wilburn also intended to Relinquish his claim
for permanent total disability.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wilburn and the defendants entered into a valid and
binding agreement whereby they intended to compromise and
settle their claims, including the claim for permanent total
disability.

Said agreement was carefully scrutinized and then

approved by the Industrial Commission.

Mr. Wilburn1s later

attempt to reassert his claim for permanent total disability
was properly denied by the Industrial Commission based upon substantial evidence that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement
which he signed was understood and intended by him to include
his claim for permanent total disability.

Agreements such as

that entered into by Mr. Wilburn are valid, enforceable and in
support of legislative and public policy.

Based upon standards

of review as imposed by the Legislature and as articulated by
the Utah Supreme Court in past decisions, the Commission's
order denying the appellant's claim for permanent total
disability benefits should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of May, 1987.
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